1.
The Constitution was primarily written by the rich class, including landowners, merchants, creditors, and public debt holders, who wanted to protect their economic interests. Charles Beard, in An Economic Interpretation, points out that the framers were primarily men of significant property, many of whom held investments in public debt or owned slaves. For example, Beard indicates that most Constitutional Convention delegates stood to gain vested economic interests in creating a strong central government to stabilize the economy and secure debt payments. Michael Parenti, in Democracy for the Few, adds that the framers were suspicious of popular democracy because they feared that the majority (small farmers, laborers, and debtors, e.g.) would endanger property rights. These excluded groups, similar to Shays’ Rebellion members (1786–87), grumbled about debt relief and inflationary policies as perceived by the elite as threats to economic order. The Constitution’s safeguards, including the indirect election of the Senate and the Contract Clause, were designed to protect the wealthy from democratic pressures.

2.
The social class structure of early American society differed in arrangement but has analogues in relationships of power. The economy in the 18th century was agricultural with a clear split between propertied elites (landowners, slave masters, creditors) and dis-franchised groups (non-property holders, slaves, women). Today, there is a more developed, industrialized economy with a larger middle class and complex elites (e.g., corporate executives, computer moguls). But economic inequality and concentrated political power persist, as in the days of the framers. Parenti argues that modern elites continue to fashion policy for the interests of capital, just as the 18th-century gentry did. The significant differences lie in legal rights for disfranchised classes and the development of a professional-managerial class, but institutionalized disparities on the basis of economic power persist.

3.
The Constitution framers feared direct democracy because they associated it with “mob rule” that could undermine their economic domination. Parenti clarifies that the framers, who were affluent owners, sought to check majority authority to preclude redistributive policies (e.g., cancellation of debt, land reform). Beard alludes to their financial interests: many framers held government securities, which would rise in value under a consolidated government with respect to finances. In order to limit democracy, they established devices like the Electoral College, life tenure on the judiciary, and a divided legislature. These bodies diluted popular rule, ensuring that creditor and slaveholding interests (e.g., through the Three-Fifths Compromise) were preserved. In essence, the framers equated democracy with the threat of lower-class rebellion against property rights and thus established a republic that would insulate elite rule.