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Source: *Crime and Justice,* Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 51-97
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147617
Accessed: 05-01-2020 21:09 UTC

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ABSTRACT

Despite some continuity with past forms and functions, police organization in the twentieth century has evolved in response to changes in technology, social organization, and political governance at all levels of society. Major developments in police organization have occurred in the areas of command organization and mobilization of patrol officers, the organization and work of patrol officers, and the access and use of information systems by all levels of personnel. While there have been some efforts to consolidate law enforcement, police organizations generally remain resistant to this goal. Bureaucratization of the police has produced numerous changes within departments and has been strongly influenced by changing conditions from outside of departments. Community-based and problem-oriented policing are reshaping the way in which some police organizations conduct their business. However, there is an equally strong focus by many departments directed at crime events and their control.

Traditional policing was localized in neighborhoods and local communities of large cities. The beat officer served to prevent, ferret out, and respond to crimes and civil disputes on his beat. The patrol car, the telephone, and the two-way radio changed all of this by giving rise to a reactive strategy of patrol policing. With the widespread availability of phones, citizens could mobilize the police patrol to respond to their "calls for service," as the police came to dub them. The police, through a central communications center, reacted to these calls by two-way radio dispatches of an available one-officer mobile patrol car. Two

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one-officer patrol cars were dispatched to the more serious incidents. Gradually, the system became more sophisticated with the availability of hand-held radios so that officers could remain in contact with the communications center at all times. When computers became available, communications center personnel were aided in making resource allocation decisions by the development of software based on resource allocation and queuing models (Larson 1972). The goal of rapid response to every citizen "call for service" soon dominated police service delivery. The capacity of citizens to mobilize the police and other emergency services was enhanced with the development of centralized 911 phone communication, and it soon led to the overload of police resources in many police departments.

Early organizational casualties of this technology were the walking beats and the station house—the basic units of a decentralized command system with the walking beats organized around station houses or police precincts. With the closing of station houses, citizens could no longer lodge complaints and adjudicate matters in their neighborhood. These could be handled only by the dispatch of officers to phoned mobilizations or travel to a central station. Officers no longer were needed to patrol a walking beat since a single officer could handle a number of walking beats from the dispatched patrol car.

The demise of the functional role of the station house in large cities was replaced by area commands as the span of technological control widened the span of administrative control. Gone were the station books in which police activities were recorded, and gone was the patrol officer's log of his work as the communications center tape and computerized record keeping replaced them. Detention and booking likewise were centralized as prisoners were more rapidly moved and processed at central locations. Families and friends of the jailed must now travel to a central detention or jail facility. Specialized tactical and investigative mobile units were developed, and they too soon came under central command as the radio provided for their mobilization on request.

Perhaps the major impact that technological inventions had was to solidify the bureaucratic centralization of command and control. The separation of the working police from the communities policed was organizationally complete. The era of the dial-a-radio-active-rapid-response-cop was by the seventies the dominant model of American policing.

Those who developed this model of policing had not, however, cal-

culated the trade-offs. Soon, owing in part to research, the costs appeared to outweigh some of the gains. It became apparent that the volume of calls for service grew at a greater rate than did department resources to handle them, particularly at times of peak demand. An initial response to this was to build decision models that set response priorities for types of calls—from emergency response to wait time. Soon research would undermine the major premise of the response time model—that by responding rapidly more criminals would be apprehended because they would still be at the crime scene. A major study of response time to calls for service by the Kansas City Police Department (1978) and its replication in other cities (Spellman and Brown 1984) undermined this premise by disclosing that the bulk of calls were for "cold crimes," those, like residential burglaries, that had taken place before their discovery. Moreover, in most cases of victimization, the time a citizen took before calling the police was greater than the police response time. Rapid response seemed to pay off only when the victim was a business where employees were rapid mobilizers.

The model had miscalculated what citizens expect of their police. Many, it turned out, did not expect a rapid response time and were willing to wait until the police could handle their problem (McEwen, Connors, and Cohen 1984). More important, the insulation of the police from their public came at a high price. The patrol officer in his air-conditioned and heated car no longer got out of the police vehicle to do preventive patrol or to learn more about the community being policed. The insulation of the police from the public to control corruption and to respond rapidly to their calls had served primarily to insulate the police from the public they were to serve. No longer did the public have confidence that the police were handling, or could handle, their problems, and many, particularly minority groups, felt alienated from the police. On transgressing and perhaps reaching the boundaries of bureaucratic rationality, police organizations appear now to be at the crossroads of a return to traditional modes of policing or pressing forward into rational, bureaucratic administration with the new symbolic forms of communication and problem solving.

This essay attempts to characterize the major ways in which policing changed during the twentieth century while maintaining continuity with the past structures and forms. Determining whether and in what ways police departments have changed is no simple matter, especially

since the serious and systematic study of police organization and behavior developed only in the last half of this century, and it remains for the most part a cottage industry.

The focus of this essay is on changes in the structure and behavior of police organizations rather than on the culture and institutions of policing and police behavior. Accordingly, I do not discuss police exercise of force and authority (e.g., Bordua 1968; Reiss 1968; Westley 1970; Bittner 1974, 1980; Klockars 1985, p. 12), their behavior as members of police organizations (Reiss 1971, 1974a; Van Maanen 1974; Manning 1977; Muir 1977; Ericson 1982), occupational effects on their daily lives (Van Maanen 1973, 1980; Punch 1983), changes in police subcultures (Wilson 1968; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983), and the basic legal institutions of policing.

Here is how this essay is organized: Section I identifies the major transitions that have occurred in police organizations during the twentieth century. Section II traces the emergence and consequences of bureaucratization in urban police organizations. Section III examines how police organizations have adapted their use of discretionary authority and accountability in this century and how they have responded to internal corruption of authority and practice. The internal organization of police work is considered in Section IV with respect to how changes in the dynamic internal and external environments have influenced it. The essay concludes with some observations and predictions about the direction of change in police organizations.

I. Police Organizational Transitions in the Twentieth Century

It is surprising how little systematic knowledge we have of changes in police organizations in this country. For much of the century we vastly overestimated their numbers. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967, p. 1) estimated that there were approximately 40,000 separate agencies; within a decade the first major census of police organizations reduced that number by about two-thirds. The question of what counts as a police organization continues to bedevil scholars. Most scholarly studies of police organizations and policing represent disproportionately the large metropolitan police departments from the eastern region of the United States and describe only the organization and behavior of police patrol.[1] There

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[1] The popular and media fascination with detectives has no parallel in the scholarly literature. There are only a few excellent studies of vice detectives (Skolnick 1966; Manning 1980).

are few systematic accounts of even short-run changes in organization. A cursory reading of the literature of police practitioners discloses, not surprisingly, that scholars and practitioners have quite different literatures. Although the practitioner literature provides snapshots that are broadly representative of police organizations and glimpses into the ways that they may be changing, the organization and its environment are rarely described. Rather, the practitioner author focuses on topics of interest to technical specialists within police departments or specialist managers or chief administrators. New technologies, especially, command attention.[2] Besides being notable for general inattention to broader structural and dynamic features of police departments, the absence of some subjects is conspicuous in practitioner writings. Topics such as controlling corruption within the police department or managing police misconduct are rarely treated.

A. The Changing Organization of Law Enforcement

As we approach the twenty-first century and ponder changes of the century almost past, it would be easy to conclude that the basic structural organization of policing today resembles rather closely that in place at the beginning of this century. At its core, policing in the United States consists of a large number of politically autonomous police organizations with overlapping jurisdiction. For all practical purposes, the personnel system of each police department is closed to lateral mobility and open only through recruiting the untrained. Likewise, each department remains at its core a quasi-military organization. Yet even a casual Martian visitor with a century scanner would remark on changes.

Characterizing those changes in police organization and policing in the twentieth century is a formidable task, however, because they are intimately linked with fundamental changes in American society. Principal among these are changes in the growth and composition of the population in cities, in the social organization and political governance of urban communities and neighborhoods, and in technology.

[2] Almost all of the major articles published in recent years in the *Police Chief*, the official publication of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, deal with technocratic themes in policing. A few illustrative titles from November 1989 to March 1990 are "A Strategic Planning Approach to Law Enforcement Training"; "Computer Based Training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center"; "The Police Dispatcher as Hostage Negotiator"; "Staff Inspection: Enhanced Systems through Internal Auditing"; "DETERS: Integrating Today's Technologies in Tomorrow's Emergency Response System"; "Artificial Intelligence, Expert Systems, Microcomputers, and Law Enforcement"; "Computer Assisted Report Entry: Toward a Paperless Police Department"; and "Art Theft: A Need for Specializing."

At the turn of the century, American cities were entering a metropolitan phase of growth that was fed by the immigration of young Europeans with high birth rates. Unlike earlier European immigrants who populated rural America, these newer waves from southern and eastern Europe settled disproportionately in the cities. Central cities of this period were a mosaic of ethnic neighborhoods under the control of a political patronage system. The closing of immigration in the 1920s stifled this source of urban growth, but throughout this century our metropolitan central cities continued to receive new populations. In the decades around midcentury, they were fed by the migration of poor whites and blacks who gradually replaced the ethnic settlements of the central city. More recently, the populations of our major metropolitan cities are changing with the arrival of diverse streams of Hispanic and Asian immigrants, giving many of our central cities a new mosaic of ethnic communities and languages.

Throughout the century, urban police organizations have been pressed to adapt to these changing patterns, but the pace was considerably slowed by institutional barriers to changing the ethnic composition of the police force. Police officers, alien in language and culture to the new arrivals, consequently came to be perceived as alien to many of the people living in the ethnic neighborhoods and ghetto communities they policed. Police departments were challenged for their resistance to demands for linguistic and ethnic representation and for equal treatment under the law. Adaptation to the patterns of immigrant settlement seems to have occurred more rapidly in the nineteenth century when the patronage system controlled police hiring and promotion.

As cities grew, so did the size of their police forces, and the number of police per capita increased markedly. Los Angeles, for example, the second largest city in the United States in 1988 with an estimated 3,402,342 inhabitants, had only 102,479 inhabitants in 1900. Their police force in the 1890s numbered fewer than 100 officers (Hale 1893, p. 302). By 1988 the city had 7,533 sworn officers and 2,470 civilian employees (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1989, table 72). Around 1900, there was roughly only one sworn officer for every 1,300 inhabitants. By 1988, that ratio had fallen to about one officer for every 460 inhabitants. Chicago provides another example. The substantial growth of Chicago from 1890 to 1900 made it the second largest city at that time with a population of 1,698,575. With 2,696 sworn duty officers, detectives, and supervisors, it had one officer for every 630 inhabitants. By 1988, with 12,163 sworn officers, the rate was one

officer for every 275 inhabitants. The rate for New York City in 1988 was one officer per 280 inhabitants.[3]

Similar comparisons for other cities disclose a seeming paradox. Although the manpower requirements of a foot-beat system of police patrol seem considerable, the personnel requirements for policing today's centralized patrol cities requires at least twice as many police officers per capita. Much of this difference can be attributed to the specialized squads and bureaus in today's bureaucratic police departments. There are proportionately fewer officers assigned to patrol today than in 1900. The patrol officer has given way to officers in specialized units.

The history of urban police in the early part of this century is so closely entwined with the political history of the city that often it is difficult to determine what changes are peculiar to police organization. Corruption, for example, was endemic to the political organization of cities and its "machine politics," as Lincoln Steffens (1931) chronicles so well in his autobiography. Municipal and police corruption scandals profoundly affected police departments as reformers attempted to neutralize the police from political patronage and to curb police protection of rackets and organized criminal activity. This neutralization took two major forms.

The first step was to transform the quasi-military bureaucracy of police organizations into a legalistic and technocratic bureaucracy whose members are committed to an occupational community with norms of subordination and service that set it apart from the community that it policed (Bordua and Reiss 1966, p. 68). This was a crucial step for several reasons. It was a way to hold police accountable to bureaucratic rather than political authority. Some municipalities even went so far as to insulate the chief from being accountable to political authority by making that position a civil service or life tenure position. Prior to these changes, police chiefs in cities were appointed by elected municipal officials or bodies and therefore subject to their demands for loyalty and performance. Moreover, bureaucratization was a means of insulating the appointment and promotion of police officers from political patronage by requiring standards of merit. Additionally, it gradu-

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[3] The source for the population sizes of these cities in 1900 is the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1942). The 1990 population counts are preliminary estimates from census counts that are still under challenge. The counts of police at the turn of the century are based on Hale (1893). The 1988 counts of sworn officers and civilian employees of police departments are taken from Federal Bureau of Investigation (1989).

ally substituted the rational allocation of police service for its allocation in response to political demands.

The second step, taken somewhat later as the result of technological inventions, was to centralize policing territorially. Whereas policing at the turn of the century was organized into walking beats that made up precincts under a local commander, toward the end of the twentieth century many police departments now operate either from a single headquarters command or, in many of our largest cities, from substation or area commands.

Technological inventions in the twentieth century instituted many social changes (Ogburn 1950). That, not surprisingly, also affected the organization of policing in the United States. More than anything else, technology made possible the demise of foot patrol and the substitution of motor patrol. In no other modern country has the automobile had as substantial an effect on policing. Major cities such as Amsterdam, Copenhagen, London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Tokyo still rely heavily on foot patrol in their central cities, whereas foot patrol is uncommon in the core of our cities, except for certain business, transportation, and public housing areas.

Changes in the technology of communication likewise exerted a major effect, especially on the centralization of command and control. At the turn of the century, officers could be centrally commanded only by means of a flashing light atop a call box—a signal to which the officer could respond when in view of a call box located at the intersection of beats. Chicago, for example, installed the Gamewell Police Telephone and Signal Company's Police Signal System in October 1890. In 1893, the department reported that it had 715 call boxes. In 1892, it reportedly handled 4,689,860 duty calls, 61,479 wagon calls, and 2,639 ambulance calls (Hale 1893, p. 222). The turn-of-the-century officer could be supervised only by a corporal or sergeant on foot, bicycle, streetcar, horse-drawn wagon, or mounted on a horse— relatively ineffective means of supervisory contact. With the advent of the radio, officers could be commanded in the field. The invention of the two-way radio and later the hand-held radio enhanced communication not only with a central command but also among officers.

Technological means of communicating and recording information have had major effects on other aspects of policing as well. Today's undercover police officers are "wired" to obtain emergency assistance as well as to communicate and record activity observed undercover. The communication technology currently available to officers facili-

tates police work. It gives officers with computer terminals in their patrol cars access to information systems. For example, officers can make quick checks to identify stolen motor vehicles or to see if citizens have outstanding warrants. In some departments, officers can file their case reports from a car terminal. Computers have substantially enhanced police capability to solve crimes, especially with recent developments in computer matching of fingerprints and gene typing.

A few contrasts in organization and style of policing may sharpen the difference between today's urban police departments and those in 1900.

1. *There have been substantial changes in command organization and in mobilization of patrol officers.*   The precinct station house was the center of command at the beginning of this century. Citizens frequently mobilized the police by appearing in person at the station house or by phoning the signal office which in turn mobilized officers through their beat call box. Beat officers responded on foot. For emergencies there were horse-drawn ambulances that were operated by the police department. The police surgeon provided emergency treatment at local stations.

By 1990, most police departments had a 911 computer-aided system for allocating calls for service to police patrol units. Many had civilian employees who screened citizen phone complaints and civilian employees who selected police vehicles to be radio-dispatched to calls; some used resource allocation and queuing models to assist in allocating officers to calls for dispatch. Officers responded by radio and were in contact at all times through car or hand-held radios. The more technocratic departments had computers in police vehicles to assist them in accessing and inputting information. Most cities had emergency medical services units to respond to emergency calls.

2. *There have been major changes in the organization and work of patrol officers.*   Patrol in 1900 was organized around foot beats and an officer assigned to the beat for each shift. Among the routine tasks required of the foot-beat officer were those of being "perfectly acquainted with all parts of his route and with the streets, thoroughfares, courts, and houses within it," "to examine in the night-time all doors, gates, and windows of dwellings of stores to see that they are properly secured, and if not, give notice to the inmates, if any," "to see that the sidewalks are not obstructed by persons loitering thereon to the inconvenience of other passengers," and to "strictly watch the conduct of all persons of known bad character" (Boston Police Department 1893). Foot-beat

officers were supervised by roundsmen who were responsible to a pre-cinct patrol sergeant.

There were few specialized bureaus or divisions, even in the larger departments. Detroit in 1893, for example, reported having 3 captains, 18 sergeants, 27 roundsmen, 215 patrolmen, and 21 doormen for as-signment to street patrol (Hale 1893, pp. 259–61). This force was apportioned to a central division and three precinct stations. Of the 215 patrol officers, 57 were assigned to day patrol, and 158 to night patrol. Additionally, there were eight detectives assigned to the central division and seven as acting precinct detectives. There were no special units as most departments know them today, although a substantial number of officers were assigned to duties at courts, for inspections, and as truant officers. A single officer was in charge of the Bertillon system, a method of criminal identification based on anthropometric measures. Eleven persons were assigned to the Gamewell Signal and Telephone System as supervisors, operators, or timekeepers—the pre-decessor to today's central communications center.

By 1990, motorized patrol had replaced foot patrol. Although offi-cers were nominally assigned to beats for proactive and preventive patrol, they were centrally dispatched over a much wider territory as the first car available to respond to a priority call. Except in high-crime-rate areas where officers were assigned to two-person cars, most patrol cars were assigned to a single officer. Where a call required more than one officer, one was assigned as the primary person to handle the call and the other as a backup or cover on the assignment.

Large urban departments today have many specialized units. Detec-tives are specialized in divisions according to the type of vice or crime to be investigated or monitored. There are specialized teams such as hostage negotiation teams to handle the taking of hostages and special weapons and tactical (SWAT) teams to handle potentially violent or collective behavior incidents. Stationary traffic enforcement often is delegated to civilian employees, and moving traffic may be handled by a special division. There is considerable functional differentiation by task within a modern police department.

3. *There has been a movement from an elementary information system with informal practices to highly formal and complex information systems to which officers routinely have access and to which they contribute information.* At the turn of the century, each station house had a station book in which all incidents and events that the desk sergeant deemed important were entered. Arrests and lodging in the station lockup were duly noted. Individual officers were not saddled with recording information as that

fell to the desk sergeant, superior officers, lockup officers, or signal clerks.

By 1990, all major police departments had a central communications center that handled all incoming phone complaints and almost all internal communications, including dispatch. Communications today are tape-recorded and available for a period of time as evidence. Much police business must be made a matter of record. Officers are obliged to be acquainted with and use many different report forms. The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, for example, has 356 different forms for reporting police matters. For some reports, a complaint case number is assigned; others simply require the completion of a report, for example, a field information form, that is turned in at the station. All other reporting is done by radio to central communications.

4. *The occupational basis of policing has been transformed.*   At the turn of the century, policing was an exclusively male occupation of sworn officers (except for police matrons in charge of women prisoners). Almost all tasks, including clerical and menial labor, were performed by sworn police officers. Officers were largely organized in brotherhoods. Although a few major departments were under civil service, most were not. There was no collective bargaining, although within a decade police strikes would become more common.

The advent of equal opportunity employment in the last half of the century opened the ranks of police departments to minorities and women who were theretofore excluded from sworn employment. Perhaps as important was the introduction of civilian employees in the department to perform many of the more technical as well as clerical tasks in information processing and for all routine work that was not enforcement related. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, had 10,023 employees in 1988, one-fourth of whom were civilians. By 1990, police officers in almost all large urban departments were organized to bargain collectively with their municipal employers under state collective bargaining legislation.[4] Police strikes were less common.

B. Organizational Fragmentation of Law Enforcement and Consolidation

Responsibility for law enforcement in the United States is divided among federal, state, and local governments. The bulk of police protec-

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[4] The last major survey was in the early 1970s (Juris and Feuille 1973, table 2-1). At that time most urbanized states mandated municipalities to bargain collectively with their police department organizations. Many had separate organizations for different ranks, e.g., patrol, sergeants, detectives, and various senior officer ranks.

tion is provided by local governments, however. In 1988, 77 percent of the 784,371 employees in police protection were local government employees. Municipalities accounted for just over three-fourths of this local police protection, and counties for the remaining 24 percent. State employment accounted for an additional 15 percent of all police protection and the federal government for 8 percent (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1990, table 7).

A consequence of our tradition of local government and of their proliferation with population growth and urban settlement is that public policing in the United States is highly fragmented among a large number of relatively small autonomous federal, state, county, and municipal organizations. Many of these departments, especially county and municipal departments, have only a few sworn officers. These autonomous law enforcement agencies are only loosely integrated in a law enforcement system of overlapping federal, state, and local jurisdiction (see Geller and Morris, in this volume).

There are a number of reasons for this fragmentation. The system of public law enforcement in the United States is fragmented, first of all, because the adoption of our federated system of national government left the organization of law enforcement to the various states. States, in turn, were bound by tradition to local governing authority and their claims to local law enforcement. Consequently, as the state chartered each county, township, or municipality, each appointed or employed a local law enforcement officer. For counties, these were sheriffs who could deputize others with the powers of law enforcement. Other localities designated citizens as peace officers or watchmen. The first new nation thus maintained continuity with the basic pattern of local law enforcement laid down by its colonial administrators (Bacon 1939; Greenberg 1974, pp. 154–87). State policing did not emerge until early in the twentieth century,[5] and, although it maintains overlapping jurisdiction with local law enforcement in most states, it has not for the most part displaced it.[6]

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[5] Legislation creating the first state police system in the United States, the Pennsylvania State Police, resulted from recommendations of President Theodore Roosevelt's Anthracite Strike Commission and Governor Pennypacker (Pennypacker 1918). The commission was created in 1902 to investigate violence between miners in their protracted strike with the anthracite coal producers and their private police, the Coal and Iron Police (Mayo 1917; Shalloo 1933, p. 86).

[6] In some states, the state police offer a contract service to local communities. In others, such as Connecticut, the state assigns a state police officer to provide police service to a local community, but these are exceptions rather than the rule.

A second major reason for the fragmentation of law enforcement into many local departments in the United States is that there remain substantial limits on the growth in size of any law enforcement body. Because law enforcement organizations are the creatures of governing bodies, as the population of our cities grew, they soon spilled over their territorial bounds into other jurisdictions of local government, such as a township or county. For a number of reasons, most local governments in the United States were unable to expand the territorial reach of their governing authority. As a consequence, local governments sprang up outside central cities. Soon, the expansion of the central city and its police jurisdiction was choked off by a ring of suburban political communities, each of which usually created its own police department as it grew.

Although aggregate statistics are lacking on the relative employee size of all law enforcement agencies, some sense of the predominance of small police departments can be gleaned from reporting on sworn officer employment for all incorporated cities.[7] By way of illustration, of the 281 city police departments in North Carolina, 56 percent have fewer than 10 sworn police officers. An additional 21 percent have between 10 and 20 sworn officers (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1989, table 72). If we assume that providing a sworn officer on duty for three tours of duty seven days a week—and taking into account vacation and sick leave days—requires the rough equivalent of five officers, then a majority of these departments has fewer than two full-time sworn officers available for protection at any one time.

Even in a highly urbanized state such as New Jersey, there were 486 city police departments in 1988. The modal department of fewer than 10 officers in North Carolina is replaced by the modal department of 10–20 officers in New Jersey. Of the 486 city police departments in New Jersey in 1988, one-fifth had fewer than 10 sworn officers and 49 percent had fewer than 20 officers; 77 percent of all departments had fewer than 40 officers. Although neither New Jersey nor North

[7] The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) report full-time law enforcement employment separately for each incorporated city but only aggregate law enforcement employment for suburban counties of metropolitan statistical areas for unincorporated places and in rural areas of counties. In 1988, rural county departments served 14 percent of the U.S. population (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1989, p. 322). Employment for sheriffs' departments include those employed in administering jails and some civil process functions so that they lack comparability with data for city departments. Additionally, law enforcement employment is reported for full-time law enforcement employees of college and university police departments.

Carolina have one of the larger police departments in the United States, only 3 percent of all New Jersey departments and 2 percent of all North Carolina departments had 200 or more officers in 1988 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1989, table 72).

Given the preponderance of small police departments, it is not surprising that from time to time there are pressures to consolidate small local police departments with larger ones, to develop more coordination among them, and to develop a more integrated system of law enforcement in the interest of efficiency and economy of management and of making professional decisions. There have been no movements to consolidate local police into a regional or state system of law enforcement comparable to that in the United Kingdom, and any conception of a national system of law enforcement is anathema to the American citizenry. Pressures toward consolidation, coordination, and integration of local law enforcement encounter substantial resistance as they run counter to the prevailing ideals of local government in the United States. The decentralization of power, authority, and decision making within organizations conforms to the ideals of democratic government and remains the dominant ideology in law enforcement.

There is very little formal integration among public police agencies, which is not surprising given the constitutional division of authority among the various states and with the federal government (Geller and Morris, in this volume). Coordination is largely voluntary with only occasional formal arrangements among local governments through the institution of contract policing, the setting of minimum standards for policing, or the institution of state-mandated training.

Public police organizations also vary in the nature and scope of their jurisdictional authority. We are inclined to think of federal agents and state and municipal police. But these vary considerably as to who is the appointing authority and to whom the police organization is responsive. There likewise are an uncounted number of special police authorities such as those for public housing and transportation and special regional or interstate compacts, for example, port authority police. Moreover, there are at least several hundred campus police departments in the United States that either appoint their own sworn officers or whose officers are appointed as supernumerary officers in an organization with sworn authority.[8]

[8] The 1988 UCR received reports of the number of law enforcement officers from 394 universities and colleges (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1989, table 73). Fewer universities and colleges reported the number of offenses known to their police in 1988.

Overlapping jurisdiction and low integration of law enforcement units are not confined to the public sector. There is a fragmentation of policing between private and public sectors as well (Shearing, in this volume). The private investigation and security industries and private organizations' employment of security personnel further divide and fragment policing in America. Currently, the size of the private policing sector, made up largely of unarmed guards and of investigative and security officers, is greater than that of our public police. Yet increasingly, private investigation and security company employees secure law enforcement powers of arrest and the right to use deadly force through state and local legislation. Potentially, private-sector policing with full sworn police powers could exceed that of the public sector. Because private police enforcement is less visible than that of public police and because they administer a private system of justice that is not currently accountable to democratically constituted authority (Shearing and Stenning 1981), substantial issues arise about their role in a democratically organized and integrated police system.

There is almost no formal integration of public- and private-sector policing, and few vehicles exist for doing so. Legislation mandating licensing of private security employees and their selection and training have a minimal effect on their integration. Additionally, increasingly both private- and public-sector organizations either contract for or employ public police officers in off-duty employment (Reiss 1991).

The complexity of this network of law enforcement agencies has thus far precluded a full description of its nature and extent for any major metropolitan jurisdiction in the United States. Lacking also is information to document changes in complexity, coordination, and integration among law enforcement organizations.

During this century, there has been some consolidation of police organizations, and there have been attempts to coordinate and integrate them. There have been two major forms of consolidation. One is the coalescence of departments into a metropolitan police department

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The two lists of reporting organizations are not identical because a number of states, such as Florida and Kentucky, did not report offenses known but did report the number of law enforcement employees. Only 43 of the 50 states are represented in the voluntary reporting system for college and university police departments. Some colleges and universities known to have campus police departments with sworn officers do not voluntarily report to UCR. The level of underestimation is unknown but appears to be substantial. The largest number of law enforcement employees in 1988 is reported for the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory with 348 employees, only 17 of whom were designated sworn officers.

when a metropolitan county form of government is adopted. Davidson County (Nashville), Tennessee, is an example. The other is the consolidation of police service through the institution of contract policing. This usually takes the form that small departments contract with a county sheriff's department or a large municipality to provide police service. California law facilitates contract policing. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, for example, contracts with 40 of the 87 incorporated cities in the county to provide all police services. Additionally, 36 other cities contract for some type of police service such as search and rescue, arson and explosives, or homicide investigation. All 87 municipalities contract for jail service. There also has been some functional integration of departments, particularly the integration of 911 communication systems that consolidate emergency services for a number of governments. Nevertheless, overall it appears that the forces among law enforcement organizations are toward fragmentation and loose coordination. There has been far less consolidation of police services than has occurred at all levels of public education, health, welfare, and emergency services.

Just why this should have been the case is not altogether clear since some of the same forces are operating on the provision of police services. Indeed, since public prosecution, jail, and court services typically are countywide, it may seem somewhat paradoxical that the movement has been at such a slow rate for police services. A number of factors may account for this slower rate of consolidation and integration.

Examination of the consolidation of local police departments through the adoption of county governments makes it abundantly clear that police departments took no initiative for consolidation and usually resisted such efforts. Indeed, no single constellation of forces accounts for consolidation of local police and other services through the formation of metropolitan county government. Correlatively, it is apparent that there is no movement among police organizations toward consolidation. Where consolidation or integration occurs, it is at the initiation of a county government movement or through contracting by municipal corporations. Police organizations, if anything, actively resist consolidation.

Perhaps a second major factor accounting for the slow rate of change is the fragmentation of both police and public constituencies for consolidated police service. Local government traditions are firmly entrenched, and the belief that local control of police is an essential ingre-

dient of local government is more firmly so. Yet there is evidence that such resistance existed also in the United Kingdom and in Australia prior to the consolidation of their police services. The major difference in the United Kingdom appears to have been that Parliament provided fiscal incentives to the consolidation of police service on a regional basis. Although such fiscal incentives have worked in other areas of public services in the United States, proposals for federal support of local police services, to be politically viable, must insure their autonomy from federal intervention and control. They must not be regarded as incentives to organizational change but as means of improving the resources and capability of local police organizations. Public fears about a Big Brother system of federal control when coupled with organizational resistance to a loss of autonomy seem sufficient to thwart the use of federal or state incentives to integrate or consolidate police organizations.

A factor contributing to both the proliferation and sometimes curbing of small local departments is that police services are provided by county sheriff's departments and some state police organizations as populations grow beyond incorporated territorial boundaries. Yet as municipal organizations emerge in these newly developed suburban and county areas, it appears more common for them to create a local police department than to continue service by county or state police organizations. Rapid growth of small municipal and town corporations associated with the suburbanization of America in the nineteenth century has further compounded the problem of coordinating and integrating police services. The political and territorial limitations on expanding the territorial jurisdiction of central city government to encompass the areas of population growth has thus contributed to the fragmentation of police domains. Correlatively, where municipal governments have extended their jurisdiction over a large territory—as was the case for Colorado Springs, Colorado, or for Dallas and Houston, Texas, or when county sheriff's departments have rapidly extended the range of services to unincorporated county areas, as in Dade County, Florida, or Nassau, New York—there has been less proliferation of local police departments. In 1988, Dade County had 3,352 police employees, and Nassau County, 3,792, ranking them among the larger law enforcement organizations in the United States.

Police departments are part and parcel of a fragmented law enforcement system, especially for municipal code enforcement. Police organizations have little authority to enforce the many code violations that

occur within their communities. The twentieth century has witnessed not only a fragmentation of the investigation of violations of municipal codes but also a decline in the ability of the police and other agencies to enforce warrants and insure compliance with them. The investigation of code violations, some of which were at one time the responsibility of the police, now lies with special investigation agencies for each type of code violation (Costello 1885; Bacon 1938). Housing, sanitation, health and safety, fire, and zoning violations, for example, and their enforcement through licensing now lie with separate agencies. Where the service of warrants for failure to comply with enforcement mandates falls on the police, they are ill equipped to do so. More to the point, perhaps, is that this fragmentation is most apparent to the police who must daily encounter its cumulative consequences. It is paradoxical that movements such as problem-oriented and community policing fail to take into account the relative powerlessness of both the police and their citizenry to deal directly with fragmented municipal code enforcement.[9]

II. Bureaucratization and Centralization

A bureaucracy, according to Max Weber (1947), establishes relations between a legally constituted and legitimate authority and its subordinate officials. Bureaucratic organizations are characterized by several relations (Bendix 1960; 1968, p. 207). There are definite and written rights and duties for each position in the organization. Each position has a fixed monetary salary. The office or position in the organization is separated from the incumbent so that no official owns the means of administration. Administrative work is a full-time occupation. Appointment and promotion to positions are based on contract, with technical training prerequisite for appointment and experience and training for promotion. Authority relations between positions are systematically ordered in a formal hierarchy.

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[9] The lack of such coordination and integration can have tragic consequences. The March 25, 1990, New York City fire that killed 87 people at a social club documents the consequences of fragmented code enforcement. On April 6, 1990, the New York City Corporation Counsel's Office, which prosecutes building code violations, disclosed that there were 42 outstanding arrest warrants on Alex Di Lorenzo III, described by the *New York Times* as an heir to a real-estate fortune and owner of more than 200 buildings in New York City. Warrants had been issued for failure to correct violations at the Happy Land Social Club, where the tragedy occurred. Some of the warrants had been outstanding since 1980. The New York City Police Department reported that it did not execute the warrants because it has more than 140,000 warrants outstanding in the city and that it was concentrating on executing warrants against violent criminals (*New York Times* 1990).

Modern, urban bureaucratic police organization emerged in England early in the nineteenth century under conditions where the ruling and middle classes were aroused by the threat of rising urban crime and criminality and by the threat that urban riot and disorder from the "dangerous classes" posed to civil society. Fearing that the military, whose ranks were filled by recruitment from the dangerous classes, might side with the urban masses and turn against the ruling elites of the day, the English Parliament created a civil police in London whose political neutrality in civil disorder was guaranteed. Moreover, as Silver maintains, the police served to deflect the hostility of the dangerous classes onto themselves (Silver 1967).

Police departments in the United States became centralized public bureaucracies only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Levett (1975, chap. 2) argues that policing in American cities in the first half of the nineteenth century had a distinct organizational form, one that he designates "entrepreneurial policing." The organization of entrepreneurial policing had certain minimal features of rational-legal authority. In particular, legally defined offices were based on contractual relations that were subject only to the authority inhering in the office. But it was entrepreneurial in that relations among officers had minimal hierarchy and members competed with each other for a maximum of individual rewards. It was entrepreneurial also in that a concern for the protection, security, and recovery of property dominated police work, and many tasks were on a fee-for-service basis.

Despite the availability of the organizational model of the London urban police as early as 1829, policing in American cities was not unified until midcentury when all of the diffusely controlled police roles were centralized under a single command and all private police were required to license with city authorities (Levett 1975, p. 59). New York City (the borough of Manhattan) was unified in 1845. Thirty years later most city departments had unified policing under a central command (Levett 1975, chap. 3).

Why was there this lag in creating unified police forces under a central command after the London model? Levett (1975, pp. 97–99), not unlike Silver (1967), contends that unification came about only when urban middle- and working-class coalition politics emerged in our major cities with demands to control the dangerous classes. The American dangerous classes differed from those in England, however. They were immigrants who threatened the middle- and working-class status quo. These immigrants were regarded as the source of urban riot and disorderly behavior.

The political sources of this unification created an organizational form that was only partly bureaucratic—what Levett (1975, p. 106) terms "politicized bureaucracies"—because patronage was the main basis for appointment and promotion. Loyalty to political patrons rather than to superior officers or to units of the police department dominates police work in this bureaucracy. Accountability is to the political party rather than to bureaucratic and governing authority. Levett's basic argument (1975, p. 108) is that the police were centralized primarily to be a major force against behavior that was politically problematic and secondarily because systemic deployment provided more effective control of offenses against property than did the entrepreneurial form of police organization. Maniha (1972), while emphasizing political fealty and the lack of independence of police from political elites, characterizes police departments in this period as facing additional barriers to bureaucratization. Among those he mentions (p. 8) are the alleged strong reliance on nepotism and ethnic affiliation in appointment and promotion, administration by civilian police commissioners who knew little about how large organizations are administered and nothing about policing, the absence of lateral entry into the department's command and staff positions, the short tenure of high police officials, personal ratings of supervisors for promotion, and the recalcitrance of police work to classification for supervision. Some of these remain late in the twentieth century as barriers to full bureaucratic organization and control.

The next stage of police bureaucratization comes late in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century as corruption scandals increasingly disclosed the singular role of political patronage in policing. Reform movements succeeded gradually in the twentieth century to establish a *police civil service bureaucracy*. The essential consequences of this bureaucratization of the police were several.

Bureaucratization in the twentieth century had a number of consequences. First, it insured the *political neutrality and legal reliability* of the police by developing a hierarchical system of command and control. That system neutralized the political power of political authorities and made police officers loyal to the police command rather than to ethnic and political groups. Their allegiance is to a community organized around an occupation that sets itself apart from the larger society (Bordua and Reiss 1966). To a substantial degree, day-to-day decision making has been removed from direct political influence of governing parties and authorities and from the arbitrary exercise of power by the

chief. Yet local bureaucracies, as contrasted with state and federal police bureaucracies, are less insulated from political authority, and the position of the commander is far less secure. Police chiefs who lack civil service tenure are beholden to political administrations for their appointment and continuation in office, which makes them responsive to external pressures from the ruling administration. The elected ruling administration in turn runs the risk that the response of their constituents to police policies and operations is critical to their continuation in power.

A second consequence of police bureaucratization is that it led to major changes in hierarchical work organization and job mobility. A bifurcation of staff and line occupational roles in an hierarchically organized command became a dominant feature of police departments. The development of the staff is especially noteworthy as an aspect of its bureaucratization. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic growth in staff officers. Maniha (1972, p. 49) reports that, as late as 1899, the St. Louis Police Department had only a handful of staff. By 1927, there was one staff officer above sergeant rank for every 2.9 line officers, and by 1949 that ratio had changed to one staff officer above sergeant rank for only 1.4 line officers. Administrators and sworn staff specialists had clearly come to dominate the police bureaucracy.

Bureaucratization has had far fewer consequences for an officer's mobility within a department, however. Bureaucratization had its greatest effect on officer recruitment, selection, and initial training. The political patronage system of recruitment was gradually replaced by a merit system based on test qualification and a rank-based system of promotion. On-the-job training now follows academy-based classroom training during the period of probationary status. Unlike most police departments in the Western world, however, American departments do not recruit separately for the staff and command positions, and there is relatively little training required to qualify for promotion to staff positions. Consequently, junior and senior officers as well as heads of police departments move by promotion and examination from the rank of patrolman to the chief officer position.

Bureaucratization carries with it a third consequence of the growing complexity of organizational structure. There is increasing task specialization and specified areas of jurisdiction for employees. Specialization in the division of labor comes to dominate the organization. Specialization in turn increases the necessity for coordination that increases the

power of staff over line officers and leads to the emergence of staff coordinators. In large departments, deputy positions proliferate. An anomalous consequence of bureaucratization of police departments is that, although there ordinarily is only a single deputy for patrol, patrol is the largest operating unit. The deputy for patrol of necessity spends a great deal of time coordinating with other functional deputies rather than being in command of patrol. Specialties such as communications, vehicle maintenance, and records intersect patrol operations and come to dominate its administration. Most of these specialties require technical rather than professional expertise and have implications for the development of a police profession. Increasingly, therefore, these come to be dominated by civilian employees. The consequence of this dependence on technology and technical specialists, however, is a further bifurcation in policing—between sworn officers and civilian employees. This bifurcation has emerged only in the last half of this century, and its full impact is yet to be realized in any department. Potentially, for example, the detective division can be dominated by civilian employees who are experts in specialties of crime analysis.

A final consequence of bureaucratization is the codification of personnel policies, basing appointment and promotion on merit rather than affiliation. To a growing extent, merit was based on expertise rather than solely on past performance, especially in promotions to the staff. In recent years, these criteria, identified in public bureaucracies with a civil service, have been modified somewhat because of equal opportunity employment legislation and court decisions. Initially, testing procedures for recruitment and promotion were challenged at the recruitment level, with contentions that recruitment was biased against minorities and women. More recently, such challenges have applied to promotions as well, especially to the nonexempt supervisory ranks.

There are limits to bureaucratization of police organizations and their centralization of authority. Like many public and private bureaucracies, local police departments have undergone only selective and partial bureaucratization. Below I examine some of the ways in which the bureaucratization of police departments is restricted or limited or where trace beginnings have been truncated. I first examine ways that the external environment of police departments limits their bureaucratic adaptation and then turn to ways that their internal environment restricts adaptation. This separation is somewhat of an artifact since I focus primarily on how the bureaucratic organization of police departments adapts to changing conditions inside and outside the department.

III.   Adaptation to the Environment

Noted repeatedly throughout this essay is the fact that all organizations engage in transactions with their environment and are vulnerable to its penetration of their integrity. But the police seem especially so. Initially, the "citizen watch" was an almost indistinguishable part of the community. The watch was an organization of civic obligation. All able-bodied adult males were obliged to perform that service. Gradually, as police organizations emerged and were centralized, they bureaucratized to limit penetration and control by their environment. The functional internal organization of police departments can be seen as an adaptation to this necessity for penetration of its environment and protection from it. Proactive police units, such as narcotics and organized crime, and some reactive units, such as traffic and patrol, are specifically organized to penetrate the civic environment. Others, such as records, are designed to preclude penetration by the larger society. Still others, such as communications, functionally link the two communities. And, finally, internal intelligence is that very special unit designed to penetrate the internal environment of the department while sealing it from civic penetration.

The features of ritualistic organization of policing, such as those of secrecy, personal identification, and the separation of uniform and undercover, can also be understood in terms of environmental penetration. Elsewhere I have pointed out that the police uniform functions to identify police in their environment, while plain clothes are the uniform of penetration. To penetrate illegal behavior successfully and counter civic resistance in their environment, police must go undercover and occupy a citizen role rather than a police role—either as infiltrators or agents provocateurs or as plainclothes officers passing as a particular kind of citizen (Reiss 1974b, p. 59). The emphasis on secrecy in police organizations can be seen similarly as a means of closing off its core to civic penetration.

Modern police organizations seem to want closed systems while searching for means to penetrate other systems that, to a growing degree, are closed to them in democratic societies.

A.   Discretionary Authority

Bureaucracies are grounded in rules and the legitimate exercise of hierarchical power in their application. Employees are expected to make decisions by a universal application of the rules in their domain of power. In theory, they have no discretion in their application, and all decisions are open to review by superiors to whom they are account-

able. The dilemma created by this bureaucratic prohibition on discretion is beautifully stated in a minor literary classic, *Catch-22* (Heller 1961). To paraphrase the military wisdom of its central character: When faced with a decision, find a rule; when a rule cannot be found, make a rule!

Although the foundation of policing is the legal order and its rules, police officers, nevertheless, have enormous discretionary powers to apply the law. Consequently, there is considerable variability among police officers. What is more, discretionary decisions are of low public visibility because often only police officers and those accused of violating the criminal law are present. Especially invisible are the decisions not to invoke the criminal law (Goldstein 1960). Particularly invisible, as Bittner (1967*a*, 1967*b*) points out, is the enormous discretion police officers exercise over citizens in their peacekeeping role. Most decisions, moreover, are unsupervised so that the exercise of discretion not to invoke the law cannot be monitored and reviewed. What is more important, discretionary decisions can be reviewed only when they are directly supervised or a matter of record. Because the police bureaucracy does not require that many discretionary decisions be made a matter of record, those choices cannot be subject to internal review. Correspondingly, only decisions of record are ordinarily subject to external review (Reiss 1974*a*).

Because police officers' decisions have low visibility to supervisory and command officers, the misapplication of rules and misuse of authority are particularly problematic. Most problematic is whether physical force is exercised legitimately (Reiss 1968; Chevigny 1969). Complaints about misapplication of rules and misuse of authority ordinarily are subject only to internal bureaucratic review. Dissatisfaction with bureaucratic internal review has led to demands for external review by civilian review boards (see next subsection).

The exercise of discretion is highly institutionalized in the American system of criminal justice (Reiss 1974*a*) in a way that is inconsistent with the bureaucratization of decision making. Bureaucracies preclude officials from making decisions under conditions of low visibility and without systematic hierarchical review and limit individual discretion in the selection and application of rules. Yet none of these constraints is institutionalized in contemporary police bureaucracies in America. What is particularly striking is that the greatest discretionary powers are lodged with the lowest-ranking officials in the system and that most discretionary decisions are not made a matter of record (Reiss 1974*a*).

The retention of these discretionary powers of law enforcement by patrol officers is an effective limit on bureaucratic police power. They stand in marked contrast with hierarchical review of at least some patrol officer decisions in European countries as, for example, the provision in Germany that magistrates and not the patrol officer determine whether a citizen is to be arrested.

B. *Organizational Accountability*

Public organizations in democratic societies are accountable to the political authority of elected officials. In the United States, municipal police organizations are held accountable largely through the appointment of the chief by elected public officials or their appointed boards. Except for a minority of civil service chiefs, chiefs of municipal police departments serve subject to the pleasure of those who appoint them. They are vulnerable to dismissal when incumbents fail to be reelected or vacate their office. Municipal chiefs are held accountable by reason of their authority for the conduct of their department and its members and are subject to dismissal for organizational corruption and officer misconduct. Sheriffs, by contrast, are elected officials who normally run on a party platform and are directly responsible to the electorate.

To reduce vulnerability in office, police chiefs developed organizational ways to hold their employees accountable. Chiefs operate on the sound organizational, but misleading civic, principle that a system of internal investigation and discipline is the way to reduce the organizations' vulnerability to scandal and reform. Complaints from external sources are investigated by an internal affairs unit that reports directly to the chief. The chief decides whether to bring charges before an internal review board or an externally appointed and co-opted board of police commissioners. In any case, the organization insures that, at most, individual officers will be charged with misconduct and that the organization will not be held accountable for their misconduct. These operating principles have led chiefs to offer the so-called rotten apple in a barrel of good apples explanation of police misconduct. Unless the individual responsible is punished, the whole barrel will spoil. Most organizational misconduct hence is assured low public visibility, and the organization need not fear charges of misconduct. Only under unusual circumstances is organizational misconduct at risk of public exposure, and that is when newspapers are able to bring charges of organizational scandal and exert pressures to reform. As Sherman (1978) concludes, this results in a cycle of scandal and reform in which

only the individual police department scandalized is reformed. Reform, more often than not, is cosmetic and begins with the dismissal of the chief, who, remarkably, normally is free of any taint of corruption. The maxim seems to be that a corrupt department needs an honest chief who can be held responsible and dismissed. Altogether, individuals rather than organizations are held accountable for organizational failures. Institutionally, then, police departments remain invulnerable to reform except through political pressure and a media-generated scandal. The American system of accountability provides no means for holding a system accountable, and organizations in that system are infrequently held publicly accountable.

With the advent of civil rights complaints against the police, there is increasing pressure for some review independent of the police department's internal review and hearings on charges. Pressures are exerted on political authorities to appoint civilian review boards. These pressures have mixed success, but rarely has any governing organization appointed a review board that is entirely independent of police participation in the review process.

Recent work by Brodeur (1989) and others makes clear why the civilian review board is a limited means for holding police officers and their organizations accountable. In reviewing the Canadian experience with civilian review boards, Brodeur draws attention to the fact that there generally is a large gap between the powers of any accountability agency, such as a police review board, and its willingness and capacity to exercise those powers. He draws attention to three different kinds of power that affect civilian control remedies. They are investigative power, that is, the power to ascertain the facts; disciplinary power, which is the power to impose sanctions; and structural power, the power to make and implement policies that remedy situations that lead to misconduct (Brodeur 1989, p. 9). Brodeur contends that the greatest gap between possession and exercise of review board powers occurs with regard to investigative powers. This disjuncture has a structural explanation.

An important reason for this disjuncture is that review boards face the dilemma that they cannot carry out most investigations without the cooperation of the police department. This remains so even if they have their own investigators, which is rarely the case. Typically, a review board must call on the police department's investigators for evidence. Even when they have their own investigators, they must still rely on the department for its internal files on the matter, and they are

dependent on individual police officers to cooperate openly and without deception. The blue curtain of police culture can readily subvert such inquiry.

Many investigations must remain indeterminate because there are contradictions in testimony that is the primary evidence available on investigation. Not uncommonly, the only testimony in addition to that of the complainant is that of one or more police officers who are either implicated in the incident or presumed to have witnessed it. Their testimony is constrained and may be compromised. Presented with testimony that on its face must be regarded as credible, no means for resolving the contradictions are available. Lacking independent and impartial witnesses, most complaints cannot be sustained.

At the heart of the review board organizational form, then, is a tenuous presumption that misconduct can be controlled by investigating incidents of misconduct and sanctioning those who are found in violation. Investigation and oral testimony are thin reeds with which to sanction officer misconduct and cannot reach the organizational and systemic sources of that misconduct. As of the close of this century, the only vehicle for processing police organizational misconduct is a government appointed commission. That is an even thinner reed as it also relies largely on blaming persons for the misconduct rather than on transforming organizations and the system of which they are a part.

During the last half of the twentieth century, police departments have had to attend both to the legality of police behavior in carrying out the organizational mandate to enforce the law and to the conformity of the department as an employer to legislative and judicial mandates that it be an equal opportunity employer and be evenhanded in enforcing the law.

Quite clearly, police organizations are adapting to the legislative and judicial mandates that it be nondiscriminatory both in enforcing the law and as an employer. To conform requires major changes in personnel selection, in recruitment and promotion procedures, and in police training. Perhaps no part of the department is left unchanged by this mandate. Departments conform at varying rates, however, some electing to litigate how and in what ways they will be required to change, while others assume less of an adversarial posture. Litigation continues, nonetheless, over essentially local department conformity to statutory and regulatory mandates. The litigation often involves qualification for promotion through legal challenges to the testing procedures and selection from among those certified as eligible for promotion. A major

constitutional issue remaining is over the establishment of minority quotas.

The evidence is clear that there has been a substantial increase in the employment of both minorities and women in police departments. Where there is a substantial minority population within a jurisdiction, such as Hispanics in Los Angeles or Miami, minority representation on the force has increased at a greater rate than in most departments. Women and minorities, nevertheless, remain underrepresented in all departments relative to their proportion in the labor force. This disproportion may be owing, in part, to the age-cohort structure of departments. Yet even the younger cohorts display selection effects. Despite gains, in 1988 women constituted only 7.9 percent of all sworn officer employment in all UCR-reporting police agencies while accounting for 64.7 percent of all their civilian employees (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1989, table 69).

The recruitment of minorities has been accelerated by court-mandated hiring quotas. Lacking, however, are statistical assessments of the success of judicial legal strategies on changing minority and gender representation in police agencies. Because either the police department of most medium and large cities or its municipality is under judicial orders to change its policies of recruitment and promotion, the presumption remains that judicial orders will exert a substantial influence to change traditional organizational practices of employment and promotion.

Evidence regarding the effects on police practice of U.S. appellate and Supreme Court decisions concerning the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution is less compelling. There is substantial agreement that defense lawyers and judges utilize the lack of conformity to these decisions as grounds for dismissal of charges, especially concerning illegal searches and seizures, involuntary confessions, and failure to advise accused of their rights. Likewise, there is evidence that detective divisions have altered practices to insure the admissibility of evidence. What is less clear is the extent to which police patrol officers alter their behavior to conform to these decisions.

The organization of intelligence gathering within police departments has changed substantially since the nineteenth century. Police patrol originally was the major source of community intelligence for the department. With the emergence of detective divisions, the intelligence-gathering function of patrol officers was neglected by commanders, even though they remained strategically placed to gather and report

intelligence. The control of police corruption now falls largely to internal intelligence units that investigate all allegations of police corruption. An inspections division has gradually been given the role of gathering intelligence on whether and how management's goals are implemented by internal operations. The decline of community intelligence inputs to police organizations has led in some departments to assigning intelligence-gathering functions to existing and newly created units, so-called community relations units. These units often serve almost exclusively to gather intelligence on police relations with minority persons.

Central to this development of intelligence units within police departments has been the development of undercover policing (Marx 1988). Since the 1930s, a major organizational innovation in undercover intelligence gathering in local police departments has been the development of secret intelligence units. The extent to which this development paralleled and was encouraged by Hoover's FBI secret domestic intelligence organization is moot. Within the largest police departments these secret intelligence units operate apart from the detective division. Some departments, in New York City, for example, even secretly recruit and train these intelligence agents so that its members are known only to those who manage them. As Marx (1988, p. 88) observes, the advantage of secret intelligence units is that investigations may last a long time because there is an organizational stake in continuing investigations.

C. Corruption of Police Organizational Authority and Practice

Police organizations, as noted previously, are organized around transactions with people and organizations in their environment (Reiss and Bordua 1967). Police officers occupy boundary-spanning roles. They are the major links through which information and behavior flow to and from the police department (Thompson 1962; Aldrich and Reiss 1971). One consequence of this functional organization of policing is that police departments risk subversion of their mandate by the environment. A central problem for police administrators is to prevent corruption of the department by these links to its environment (Shearing 1981).

Even prior to the establishment of modern police organizations, the deviance of "the watch" was notorious (Bacon 1939). Later descriptions of early nineteenth-century police departments are replete with accounts of discharging chiefs as well as officers for engaging in illegal

acts arising from the misuse of their occupational authority (Maniha 1972). Of particular concern was the corruption of their authority by criminal interests and political organizations (Steffens 1931).

A major solution to the problem of police corruption was the adoption of the bureaucratic form of rational administration. The introduction of a hierarchical system of command and control with supervision and discipline of individual officers was regarded as a solution to the problem of corruption. Almost all police departments therefore adopted the basic hierarchical rank organization of the military to insure internal discipline and control.[10]

The bureaucratic solution tended to disregard the fact that bureaucratic administration creates an internal organization of administrative and operating units. These units vary in their vulnerability to corruption. Some units are particularly vulnerable to subversion because they police organized illegal behavior in the community. Much of their work requires undercover investigation and organizational secrecy that is not open to direct hierarchical control—a problem general to all espionage organizations. Accordingly, police departments are particularly vulnerable to the corruption of their vice units because vice detectives engage in secret undercover policing of organized criminal activity.

Police departments also are vulnerable when the hierarchical command is locally organized territorially. Local commanders and their officers are open to penetration by criminal organizations in their precinct or substation. Widespread corruption of detectives and patrol consequently is quite common in precincts where there is considerable organized crime. Hierarchical command both within the police department and within organized crime facilitates that corruption since those at the lowest levels of the organizations operate the payoffs between the organized crime and the police department hierarchies (Cressey 1969). The linchpins in that exchange are the "bagmen" and their supervisors who distribute payoffs to the command (Landesco 1968). Corruption of a territorial police command is unlikely unless at least the supervisory command is implicated in the illegal gain. The hierarchical organization of payoffs in police departments makes it difficult to pene-

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[10] There is a common misperception that police departments always operated with a quasi-military structure of command. Most departments did not do so until late in the nineteenth century and then usually to introduce discipline to control police behavior and the corruption of officers. Maniha (1972, p. 49) reports that the St. Louis Police Department did not give in to a military hierarchy and organization of staff functions until the Police Reorganization Act of 1899.

trate the corruption of the command and to hold higher officers accountable for the corruption in their district.

In the twentieth century, some police administrators (Wilson and McLaren 1972) concluded that a decentralized territorial organization of policing into beats and precincts made departments vulnerable to widespread corruption by fostering close contacts that could not be monitored. Accordingly, police administrators sought to further insulate the organization from its environment. One way of doing so was implemented in the 1950s by O. W. Wilson in Chicago (see Wilson and McLaren 1972). The general strategy is to remove officers insofar as possible from other than work contacts with the public. They are removed from foot-beat patrol, which provides too many opportunities for corruption by close personal contacts with residents and businesses on their beat. Removed to a motorized beat patrol in one-person cars, officers are permitted little opportunity to congregate. Supervisors are placed in vehicles and closely monitored as to the kind and level of supervision. The station house is downgraded as a place for handling criminal matters, and station commanders are responsible to an area commander. To restrict opportunities for corruption of command officers by bribes and payoffs from illegal activities operating in their command area, commanders are rotated quite frequently to other precincts or commands. In brief, under this strategy, there is a substantial restructuring of the territorial and command organization of policing to insure stricter control over the opportunities of corrupting officers, their supervisors, and their commanders. This model was adopted fairly widely, in part because of its reputed capacity to control corruption. In all but the largest cities, the adoption of the Wilson model of rational police administration has led to the elimination of all station houses and to centralization of command and control in a single headquarters command.

The corruption of detectives by their environment remains problematic. There have been only a few other innovations designed to minimize their corruption. One is to organize a dominant coalition to control corruption following a corruption scandal (Sherman 1978, pp. 247–50). The major control efforts have been premonitory, that is, interventions to control deviant acts prior to their occurrence (Reiss, cited in Sherman 1978, p. 20). One of these premonitory innovations has been to utilize the internal intelligence division to penetrate detective units for early detection of their organized subversion. Another has been to rotate the assignment of detectives across territories so

that they have less opportunity to become enmeshed in an organized transaction system of bribery and payoff. There is little evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of these organizational strategies for controlling corruption. On the whole, the twentieth century has witnessed few organizational changes designed to control the subversion of the organization's goals by illegal activities. It remains a concern of all police administrators.

IV. The Internal Organization of Police Work

The bureaucratic organization of police departments experiences considerable turbulence from its own environment. This is partly due to the fact that its external environment is turbulent and far from predictable. Changes in the external environment invariably have repercussions for its internal organization. But police departments also experience considerable flux as internal composition and organization change. Police departments' responses to changes in their external and internal environments often impose limits on bureaucratic organization and control.

A. Emergence of a Legalistic and Technocratic Bureaucracy

Since Max Weber (1947) propounded his theory of bureaucracy, organizational studies commonly focus on the internal structure of organizations and on task differentiation within the organization. Among the first to challenge this emphasis were Reiss and Bordua (1967, pp. 25–55). The production of the police, they noted, lies primarily in relations with their environment and its boundary transactions. The modern metropolitan police exist only because communities are legally organized and the fundamental organizational task of the police is to mediate between the urban community and the legal system. The police are, in their words, "a fundamental representative of the legal system and a major source of raw material for it" at the same time that "the police adapt the universalistic demands of law to the structure of the locale by a wide variety of formal and informal devices" (1967, pp. 26–27).

At the same time, Thompson (1967, p. 19) concluded that under norms of rationality, organizations seek to seal their core technologies (specific actions that produce a desired outcome) from environmental influences. The *core technology* of police organizations is the *production and processing of information* (see Manning, in this volume). That this is the core technology of policing should not be confused with the obser-

vation that the distinguishing property of the police is that they are empowered to use coercive means by the threat or actual use of force, provided it is exercised legally. Bittner (1974, 1980) and Klockars (1985) fail to separate the core technology of police organizations from the legitimation of the right of its members to use force against others.

Unlike most organizations, however, police departments cannot readily seal their core from external intrusion. The fundamental task of a police organization is to manage and respond to external demands from people and other organizations. They must create, maintain, respond to, and participate in external relationships more than the prototypical corporate organization. The municipal police as an organizational system may be thought of, then, as moving from environment to organization rather than the reverse.

As the twentieth century wanes, it has become clear that the transactions of police organizations with their environment are substantially determined by the goals and means of a legalistic and technocratic bureaucracy. Police organizations have transformed their operations by increased emphasis on management by technology and technical specialists. Of necessity, they have adapted the practice of policing to the legalistic demands of the formal legal system. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the role that technology plays in the production of police evidence.

Each technological change—from the telephone, patrol car, and two-way radio transmission to the computer—has had a significant impact on internal organization and operation of police departments. These inventions and their technologies have affected the organization of police command and control, especially of police deployment and response, and they have affected how information is received, transmitted, and processed. Adaptations to social technologies, such as those of organizational behavior and risk analysis, while less pervasive, are becoming characteristic modes of rational technocratic administration in police departments.

Easily neglected in understanding police organizations are the myriad ways that technocratic management is linked to the production of evidence for the legal system. Technology and technical experts have pervasively altered both proactive and reactive policing. Detectives and police evidence technicians are the major consumers of technology since theirs is the closest link to formal trials. Certainly today's detectives are far more given to technology than logical deduction in dealing with crimes. Their role is less that of solving particular crimes by

deduction than of producing evidence for arrested or suspected persons. The narcotics division detective must collect samples of apparent controlled substances and submit them for verification by laboratory test to make a charge stick. Increasingly, they may also seek blood and hair samples. The many narcotics detectives who make buys to secure a search warrant, moreover, are "wired" with sophisticated recorders and transmitters not only for their protection but also for use as evidence. Homicide and sex crime detectives have come to rely on blood, tissue, and hair samples. More recently, they rely on gene typing to determine whether a suspect is the offender in rape cases.

The use of technology in the control of crime is by no means limited to detectives. Radar has become the major means of patrol enforcement of traffic violations. Patrol officers are linked to mainframe computers permitting on-line checks for outstanding warrants, stolen vehicles, and the status of motor vehicle registrations and licenses. They are trained in identifying intoxicated drivers and in the use of Breathalyzers. In some cities all patrol cars are equipped with fingerprint kits, and police are taught how to use the Automated Finger Print Identification System, a computerized system for matching fingerprint specimens. Police evidence technicians now work more closely with fire department specialists in arson investigation. Like the employees of all emergency service organizations, police officers are taught emergency survival techniques, including the Heimlich maneuver of resuscitation.

The technocratic aspects of policing are not limited to the use of material technologies. There are parallel developments in the development and use of social technologies. Perhaps the two that have gained widest adoption in police departments are those of hostage negotiation and SWAT units. Police share with emergency medical services units the development and use of social and psychological technologies for dealing with suicide attempts.

Much of the technocratic emphasis in policing derives from a model of proactive and reactive crime control. Although institutionalized to a lesser degree, police departments also have crime prevention units and programs. By the 1990s, metropolitan police departments not only had community-based prevention programs like Crime-Watch (Skogan 1986, pp. 203–29) but also drug education programs in schools like Drug Abuse Resistance Education (Kleiman and Smith 1990, pp. 69–108).

The technocratic managerial emphasis in police departments contributes to the further development of a rational bureaucratic organiza-

tion. A characteristic of Weberian bureaucracy (Weber 1947, pp. 329–58) is that it substitutes routine and rational procedures for traditional practices. The information exchange and processing technology of the twentieth century has displaced many of the traditional forms and practices of police departments. Indeed, a major consequence of the technology is that it has changed the very nature of rational discourse within and by organizations. In most police departments, the symbolic forms of communication of the police with the public have been transformed by the telephone and 911 dispatch and, among the police, by two-way radio communication. Manning (1989, in this volume) has drawn attention to the ways that the technology of communication leads to the transformation of communications into an organizational processing language. The language of dispatch and response, for example, becomes cryptic. Often numerical codes are substituted for ordinary speech, thereby eliminating not only the redundancy integral to a language but also significant portions of speech communication. Records are stored as digital codes, thereby freezing information in time and rendering it as obsolete communication for reprocessing in the future. Computerized information is gradually transforming the ways a department is managed. Management decides what information is to be collected routinely as a basis for decisions. The more modernized departments feed computerized information into case management decision models such as the queuing models setting dispatch priorities (Schaack and Larson 1988), resource allocation models for manpower and tactical deployment (Larson 1972), and modus operandi models for solving crimes.

Faced with a turbulent environment and often rapid social changes, police organizations generally adapt the organization to perturbations and fluctuations in demand for police service rather than intervene directly in their environment (Reiss 1982). They are unlikely to forecast changes in their environment and plan adaptations to them. One reason why police organizations appear to be recalcitrant in forecasting future changes in their environment is that typically they operate under norms of organizational rationality that permit them to adapt to their changing environment. As Thompson (1967, p. 22) observed, ordinarily organizations do not forecast when they can successfully control inputs to and outputs from the organization. Owing to the enormous discretionary power of the police over inputs and outputs, they ordinarily can successfully buffer their operations from any turbulence in their environment. They level or smooth their input and output

transactions (Thompson 1967, p. 21). They do so in a variety of ways, such as allocating manpower and resources to approximate peak demand. In emergency situations, they can resort to rationing their supply, reallocating officers to crisis demand.

When the environment of the organization becomes too turbulent for these adaptations, police managers take other measures to protect the organization and its core functioning. The main way to do so is temporarily to augment manpower either from supernumerary officers or by drawing on other police or even military organizations. The state police, the National Guard, and even paratroopers have been used in the United States to handle the turbulence of major urban riots.

Research and development units are the major units within organizations that seek to shape their transactions with internal and external environments. Research is empirical investigation that describes and explains how things behave and how that behavior can be changed. Development is the implementation of models that demonstrate that an intervention works in a predictable way. Police organizations essentially lack research and development units. The research unit of most police organizations typically is responsible for providing a statistical description of the organization and its inputs and outputs. Rarely does it undertake research that might lead to intervention. Police organizations satisfy research and development needs primarily by looking to universities for research that may lead to intervention models and to private industry for their development.

Research and development is not yet a core technology of police departments. Adaptive organizations generally rely on research and development as a core technology either to solve problems that fall within the organization's mandate or to adapt the organization to its changing environment. Goldstein (1979) has argued for a problem-oriented police, one that seeks to define and find solutions to police and community problems. A problem-oriented approach to policing requires minimally that its core technologies include research. Perhaps even more important, the applied research of engineering sciences, including social engineering, must become part of that core technology. Yet more is required in a genuine research and development model. Implementation of research requires model development and testing under field conditions. The implication for police organizations is that they must alter their relations with their environment to allow for model testing as well as provide for research and development units within the organization.

B. Third-Party Limitations on the Exercise of Bureaucratic Authority

There has been a substantial increase in the number of police unions since midcentury. Most are local organizations. State or national bodies play only a minor role in police employee relations (Juris and Feuille 1973, p. 27). The main reason for this is that the terms and conditions of municipal police employment are determined primarily by exchanges among local city officials, local police management, and local police union leaders (Juris and Feuille 1973, p. 27). This local locus of control of the employment relationship accounts also for the general failure of centralized national police organizations or of national labor organizations either to enroll large numbers of police officers as members or to develop strong local affiliates (Juris and Feuille 1973, p. 27). Thus, although a majority of local governments must bargain collectively with police unions, the lateral organization of unions is weak. There is considerable variation among local departments, however, in how their employees are organized for collective representation. Police unions may cover all ranks in the department, but ordinarily at least some ranks are organized separately from patrol (Juris and Feuille 1973, table 2-1).

Police management, then, often must deal with two or more police unions and other third-party organizations that pose limits to their bureaucratic authority. This limitation is most evident in collective bargaining and the settlement of employee grievances and public complaints. Matters for collective bargaining and employee grievances are rarely resolved by bilateral negotiations between management and employees. Not only are management and workers represented by third parties in collective bargaining—the municipal corporation and the police unions representing different ranks, respectively—but each also mobilizes and involves other agents in the process of negotiation and settlement. Moreover, the negotiators often must seek ratification for their settlement. Municipal negotiators, for example, must seek budgetary and often legislative approval for proposed settlements, and unions are able to divide the municipal managers. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that municipal organizations may also be subject to pattern bargaining with public safety unions. The settlement of police and fire department contracts may be linked.

The process of collective bargaining therefore is one of multilateral bargaining (McLennan and Moskow 1969, pp. 31–40) in which there may be considerable infringement of bureaucratic authority for at least some of the parties to the settlement. Moreover, as Juris and Feuille

(1973, p. 44) observe, settlement in the public sector of policing occurs primarily in a political rather than an economic context—as does most private-sector bargaining or public-sector bargaining when there is a private-sector alternative source for the service. Policing is a monopolistic service financed from revenues that have little connection with the service provided. Additionally, the settlement is often determined by political rather than rational calculation of costs and benefits.

Third parties are also involved in grievance and complaint processes. Police managers, not uncommonly, find their decisions in employee grievances are appealed to third parties such as a municipally appointed police board, the courts, or, in some states such as Connecticut, to state arbitration. Additionally, unions, not uncommonly, delay the settlement of grievances so that their settlement may be an additional bargaining chip in collective bargaining. The prerogatives of bureaucratic managers likewise can be infringed when civilian complaints are referred to civilian review boards for settlement. It is not surprising that not only police officers but also police managers resist the creation of such boards as each regards it as an infringement on autonomy.

Until early in the twentieth century, the line organizations of police officers were "benevolent and protective associations" dealing with matters that later were handled by municipal insurance and pension funds. Gradually in this century, local organizations of municipal police departments began collective bargaining as state laws and local ordinances permitted. Because of the perceived importance of maintaining law enforcement services without disruption, statutes typically prohibit police officers from striking. Despite this restriction, police unions and brotherhoods use other formal and informal powers to win concessions in collective bargaining. Where they have been denied the legal right to strike, police resort to exercising informal powers. Tactics such as restrictions of output by writing fewer traffic warrants that provide municipal revenue or calling in sick—the "blue flu"—coupled with issue and candidate electoral politics often achieve the same goal (Juris and Feuille 1973, p. 101).

Although police unions generally are limited to bargaining over wages, hours, and benefits, that too is changing. Where off-duty employment is contracted by the municipality, the union may bargain over conditions of off-duty assignment and wages. There are growing demands to control assignments and conditions of work, promotion, and discipline. Most municipal authorities still resist such demands on grounds that they infringe on the legitimate discretionary powers of

the police commander. Yet they are not always successful. When the principal line union of the New York City Police Department failed to secure control over hours of assignment from New York City, they were able to obtain such concessions from the state legislature.

Police unions are powerful organizations quite apart from their power in collective bargaining. They exert political power in controversial issues affecting policing. Police unions have mounted successful campaigns against civilian review boards. They support litigation expenses on challenges to promotion procedures, and they maintain active lobbies in legislative assemblies. Additionally, they are a major source of financial support for the defense of police officers who are charged in criminal matters.

C. Transforming the Organization of Police Work

As modern policing emerged through the consolidation of inspection services with the day and night watches (Bacon 1939), a career police emerged. In the early years, however, policing was often a transitory occupation. Moreover, corruption was endemic in many police departments, and policing had a fairly low status as departments experienced repeated cycles of scandal and reform. A quasi-military form of organization was adopted in the post–Civil War period to deal with these problems. What seems to be meant when policing often is referred to as a quasi-military organization is that it rationalized hierarchical authority by adopting the basic military form of hierarchical organization. Several elements made for a relatively easy transition to a command bureaucracy and a higher status police occupation. They included the institution of an hierarchical command based on military ranks, adoption of a cadre system of training and deployment, the institution of strict discipline with strict penalties for nonconformity, and a closed system of promotion from within the ranks.

Traditionally, all members of a police department were sworn employees with full law enforcement powers. Sworn officers performed all administrative, technical, and clerical functions. In recent decades, civilians have been employed in many administrative, technical, and clerical positions. The number of sworn officers and their proportion of total employment has declined in many large departments in recent decades, partly owing to the demand for technical expertise not possessed by sworn police officers but primarily because of the relatively lower investment required for training civilians and their lower continuing cost compared with the cost of a sworn employee. In 1978, the

New York City Police Department, for example, had 28,012 employees, of whom only 17 percent were civilians (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1979, table 60). A decade later, in 1988, it had 36,027 employees, of whom 26 percent were civilians (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1989, table 72). Thus, while the department grew by 29 percent, sworn officers increased at a lesser rate than did civilian employees.

Although the extent to which police departments have been bureaucratized varies by size and governing authority, police departments have been affected by a movement to develop organizations based on a professional model of policing. As Gross and Grambusch (1974) have pointed out, there are certain inherent contradictions between an ideology that emphasizes autonomy of professional practitioners with minimal bureaucratic control and an ideology of bureaucracy in which the professional is subject to hierarchical authority that infringes on autonomy. The contemporary resolution of this contradiction in policing appears to have two parts: first, the emergence of organizations whose goal is to develop professional specialties by retraining officers in specialist police academies to behave as professionals; second, to employ semiprofessional technical specialists whose training and experience is gained outside police organizations but who are expected to operate under a hierarchical command.

Whatever the police profession may turn out to be, it is at present a far cry from an elective profession based on police professional control of police education. Although a junior college or four-year college degree is ·a requirement in a growing number of police departments, especially West Coast police departments, academic training for police is dominated by general criminal justice program education based in colleges and universities. Police appear less likely than in earlier times to seek legal training at a night law school. They are underrepresented in public and private management programs in comparison with members of other public bureaucracies. The implementation of a professional educational program for a professionalizing ideology is barely under way. Police work is one of the few occupations that qualifies for professionalization; police work satisfies all of the core elements that define a profession: making decisions that involve technical and moral judgments that affect the fate of people (Reiss 1971, pp. 122–23).

Police departments in America, unlike those in most other countries that adopted a quasi-military form of organization, failed to adopt a significant feature of military organization—a bifurcated system of entry equivalent to officer and commandeered ranks in the military.

American police departments soon made a virtue of an open mobility system in which individuals could enter at the lowest rank and conclude their career at a high rank, even though few could do so because there are few positions at high ranks. Appointment to ranks above sergeant is usually based on performance ratings by superior officers. There are no generally adopted national standards of test performance or experience ratings for entry or promotion to any rank, although advisory groups have repeatedly developed such standards.

The failure of police departments to institutionalize the equivalent of a separate officer and line corps has had profound implications for the development of a professional police in America. A single set of recruitment standards for all entrants coupled with an open system of mobility based on minimal standards of education and achievement is unlikely to produce a professional police. Departments are instead likely to continue to meet organizational demands for professional and technical specialties by civilian employment, by expert consultation, or by "outside contract."

The idea of a professional police encompassing all members of an organization is at striking odds with what we know about organizations with professional employees. Professionals constitute only a single occupation within service organizations, whether those given to health care, education, welfare, or civil and criminal justice. Normally, service organizations include different kinds of professionals and a substantial and diversified cadre of nonprofessionals. Indeed, modern organizations, including police departments, must depend substantially on technicians as well as on professionals. Perhaps police departments will become even more professionalized through bifurcation of the sworn and civilian cadres with the latter supplying the knowledge and skills of the different professions that contribute to the tasks a police department must accomplish.

V. Conclusion

Police organizations do not stand still. They undergo continuous, often imperceptible, change. As the twentieth century draws to a close, the twin ideologies of community-based and problem-oriented policing are reshaping at least the way some police organizations do their business. Community policing may be viewed as a reaction against the centralization of command and control in a police bureaucracy. Gone are the local community roots of policing and its symbolization in a community police station. In its place is a central police station and lockup

far removed from the citizens who, as suspects or victims, required its services. A consequence has been their alienation from a police they know only by their resort to 911 or who come to fetch them for their misdeeds. Although the centralization of command was accomplished with the goal of a more efficient delivery of police services—by rapid mobilization of citizens and police response to their calls for service— they often appeared only to alienate those who were served. Moreover, to the degree that centralization sought to neutralize the police department from subversion of its goals and authority by political constituencies and organized criminal groups, it at the same time neutralized civic power over the local police. Citizens experienced impersonality in their contacts with the police and abandonment of their local community and its problems. These feelings were both fed and exacerbated by the fact that most other city services also became more centralized and less responsive to local preferences. It is expected that community policing will not only bring police closer to the citizens they serve by reinstituting foot patrol but also by making police develop new policing strategies through citizen participation. A new position has been developed for either police or civilian employees of police departments—the community service officer who performs many citizen contact functions and links local citizens to other urban service organizations. Their participation and that of citizens more generally are expected to reduce their social isolation and in turn make citizens less alienated and enhance their sense of power. Paradoxically, the movement toward a community police with greater local political and citizen participation threatens the very political neutrality of the police, for local rather than universal standards of legality may easily prevail and political power may again become the basis for allocating what are after all scarce police resources.

Problem-oriented policing may be seen as a reaction against what are regarded as the preoccupations of a centralized command— preoccupation with management, internal procedures, and efficiency. Absent is institutionalized concern for the wide range of problems that constitute police business (Goldstein 1990, p. 15). Like community policing, problem policing is concerned with a community and its problems and with engaging the citizenry in overall problem solving. Problem-oriented policing begins with the grouping of police incidents as problems and then moves to disaggregating them into their problem-solving elements. As such it is amenable to a research strategy

and would seem highly dependent on research and development as its core technology. Sherman has advanced a special model of research and development for problem-solving policing—the location of "hot spots"—an elaboration of an earlier model of location-oriented policing. The general idea is to concentrate police resources at locations that are repeatedly victimized (see Sherman, in this volume).

The implementation of the programmatics of either ideology faces enormous hurdles in the face of the underdevelopment of research and development capacities and community service units in police departments. Little consideration has been given to the organizational capability required for the implementation of either program or to the limited capability of any single police organization to problem solve. Research and development generally requires more resources than a single police organization—even the largest ones—can command for the wide variety of problems the organization faces. A problem-solving police will have to find collective research and development models of problem solving.

Some cities are building substations around which a community-based policing system will rise again, like a phoenix from its ashes. Mixed models of centralized and decentralized command and control are being tried. In these mixed models, some officers are assigned to community police work and are given substantial discretionary powers to deal with community problems, while others are centrally commanded and deployed to respond to victimization complaints and emergencies. The role of specialized units, whether of vice or traffic, is unclear in these mixed organizational models of policing as new strategies are tried and old ones are modified. I will hazard a guess that police departments are entering a new period of organizational transformation in which material technology will be reduced to the role of an equal player with social technologies—social technologies that are both underdeveloped and under-utilized in the police organizational context. These are the social technologies of research problem solving, of engineering social relationships, and of organizational techniques for managing human problems.

The contrast in rhetorics of community and problem-oriented policing is overdrawn. Yet the rhetorics of contemporary policing characterize the dilemma of police organizations and administrators at the close of the twentieth century. The dilemma of modern policing seems to lie in determining whether to continue opting for rational, bureaucratic

administration centering on crime events and their control or, rather, to transform policing into a community and social problem-centered bureaucracy that is accountable to localized groups.

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